court permitted suit against nursing home
LYNN PROFETA AND
FRED R. PROFETA, JR., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. DOVER CHRISTIAN NURSING HOME,
DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. IHSAN M. UYGUR, M.D.,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division.
Decided March 14,
1983.
189 N.J. Super. 83 (1983)
458 A.2d 1307
Before Judges MICHELS and TRAUTWEIN.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary
judgment dismissing their complaint. The complaint, in four counts, alleged
that defendant Dover Christian Nursing Home (nursing home) violated its
statutory duty to notify next of kin of any change in a patient's medical
condition (count I); nursing home was negligent in its failure to give such
timely notice (count II); nursing home's failure to give notice arose out of
willful and wanton conduct (count III), and the home's disregard of its
statutory duty was intentional (count IV). Plaintiffs sought both compensatory
damages, based on their mental pain and anguish, and punitive damages. Defendant
answered and joined the patient's private physician as a third-party defendant.
Nursing home then moved for summary judgment, which was granted. This appeal
followed.
[189 N.J. Super. 85]
From the pleadings and affidavits before
the trial court we glean the following undisputed facts. Plaintiffs Lynn and
Fred Profeta are the daughter and grandson of Ferdinand Virgilio. Virgilio was
admitted to nursing home on October 26, 1977.1 Nursing home is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Christian Research Institute, a Delaware corporation organized as a nonprofit
religious and educational corporation authorized to do business in New Jersey.
Virgilio became seriously ill on February 11, 1978. Plaintiffs were not
notified of this fact. On February 12, 1978 Lynn Profeta, in making a regular
visit to the nursing home, found her father vomitting on himself and unable to
breathe. She immediately had her father transferred to a hospital but he died
on February 14, 1978. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against the nursing home
on February 8, 1980.
Plaintiffs sought recovery under N.J.S.A.
30:13-1 et seq., entitled "An act concerning the responsibilities
of nursing homes and the rights of nursing home residents" and more
commonly known as the nursing home residents' "bill of rights." The
declared purpose of the act is to advance the well-being of the residents by
defining their rights so that these rights may be better asserted. A finding
that "residents of nursing homes are all too often given inferior treatment"
led to the inclusion in the act of detailed standards of care for all nursing
homes. Senate Institutions, Health and Welfare Committee, Statement to Senate
Bill No. 944 (June 4, 1976).
In granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment the trial judge concluded:
I
am of the opinion that such a claim, the infliction of the emotional distress
of a daughter and a grandson as a result of the death of a nursing home
resident because of failure to notify, does not give rise to a
statutorily-created or other cause of action in this jurisdiction.
[189 N.J. Super. 86]
I
make brief reference without discussing the case in detail to Portee v.
Jaffee, 83 [84] N.J. 88, decision of our New Jersey Supreme Court,
1980, in which
Justice
Pashman carefully outlined the circumstances under which in this jurisdiction a
person who does not have potential for personal injury himself or herself can
recover for distress resulting from perceiving the negligently-inflicted
injuries over another.
That's
the limitation on that case. There was nothing perceived here. Everything
occurred after the fact insofar as any emotional distress could be concerned.
Our careful review of the pleadings, the
affidavits offered on the motion for summary judgment and the briefs discloses
that the sole relevant issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs have requisite
standing to bring suit under N.J.S.A. 30:13-8.2 That statute states:
Any
person or resident whose rights as defined herein are violated shall have a
cause of action against any person committing such violation. The Department of
Health may maintain an action in the name of the State to enforce the
provisions of this act and any rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to
this act. The action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction to
enforce such rights and to recover actual and punitive damages for their
violation. Any plaintiff who prevails in any such action shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action.
Another portion of the act states that
"every nursing home shall have the responsibility for ... [e]nsuring
compliance with all applicable State and Federal statutes and rules and
regulations." N.J.S.A. 30:13-3(h). Plaintiffs point to a
regulation, the present N.J.A.C. 8:30-2.4(a), as defining the right
encompassed by the act which they claim has been violated. That regulation
reads in pertinent part:
Written
policies and procedures shall be established for notifying sponsors or next of
kin in the event of significant changes in patient's status, patient charges,
billings or other relevant administrative matters.
N.J.S.A. 30:13-8 allows actions to enforce the act and to recover damages for its
violation. The statute provides that "[a]ny person or resident whose
rights as defined herein are violated shall have a cause of action against any
person committing such violation." Both parties ask this court to
interpret the phrase "any person ... whose rights are defined
herein."
[189 N.J. Super. 87]
Plaintiffs seek an interpretation which
would include a resident's next of kin as a person who could sue while
defendant contends that the phrase is intended to include only a resident or
his legal guardian.
In this regard we strive to determine
legislative intention. Did the Legislature intend that only residents or their
guardians have the sole right to sue to enforce rights under the statute or did
they intend to include those individuals, such as the next of kin, who are
named in the act and given rights incidental to that of the resident? In this
sense the phrase under scrutiny is ambiguous and must be interpreted in
accordance with discernible legislative intent and reasoned judgment. State
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 154 N.J.Super.
550, 553 (App.Div. 1977); Imbriacco v. Civil Service Comm'n, 150 N.J.Super. 105,
109 (App.Div. 1977); State v. Hoboken, 130 N.J. Eq. 564, 570 (Ch.
1942). Plaintiffs point to two provisions of the act where the resident's next
of kin are arguably given rights. The first is N.J.S.A. 30:13-5(g),
which reads in pertinent part:
Every
resident of a nursing home shall ... have the right to retain the services of
his own personal physician at his own expense or under a health care plan.
Every resident shall have the right to obtain from his own physician or the
physician attached to the nursing home complete and current information
concerning his medical diagnosis, treatment and prognosis in terms and language
the resident can reasonably be expected to understand, except when the
physician deems it medically inadvisable to give such information to the
resident and records the reason for such decision in the resident's medical
record. In such a case, the physician shall inform the resident's next of
kin or guardian. [Emphasis supplied]
This provision is the cornerstone of
plaintiffs' interpretation. They argue that since next of kin are given the
right to receive medical information concerning a resident, they should also be
permitted to recover damages suffered as a result of a violation of that right.
The second right of the next of kin said
to be provided under the act is the right to be notified of the resident's
change in status, as required by N.J.A.C. 8:30-2.4(a).
After careful consideration of the
purposes and policies of the act we conclude that a proper interpretation of
"persons whose
[189 N.J. Super. 88]
rights are defined herein" pertains
only to a resident or his legal representative.
N.J.S.A. 30:13-1 announces the legislative thesis underlying the entire act:
The
Legislature hereby finds and declares that the well-being of nursing home
residents in the State of New Jersey requires a delineation of the
responsibilities of nursing homes and a declaration of a bill of rights for
such residents.
The provisions delineating the responsibilities
of nursing homes (N.J.S.A. 30:13-3) and declaring the rights of their
residents (N.J.S.A. 30:13-5) are the heart of the act. The remaining
provisions serve only to implement these two sections. The sense of a statute
is to be gathered from the whole of the expression. Martell v. Lane, 22 N.J. 110, 117 (1956).
Once the "internal sense" of the law is clear it will prevail over
the words of the act and "particular terms are to be made responsive to
the essential principle of Law." San-Lan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale,
28 N.J. 148, 155 (1958). See,
also, State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382,
390-391 (1974); New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair,
60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972); Wright
v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1,
6 (1951). The act at issue is clear in its purpose, and that is to advance the
well-being of nursing home residents. Because the sense of the law, gathered
from all internal indicia, is to aid residents, we believe the phrase "persons
... whose rights are defined herein" was intended to refer only to the
resident or one asserting rights in his stead, such as a legal guardian. The
asserted right of the next of kin to receive medical information concerning the
resident if deemed advisable and to be informed of any significant change in
the resident's status, support our conclusion. Both are primarily designed to
aid the resident, when he or she is either incapable of acting in a meaningful
manner on the information given or is likely to become incapable of so acting.
For this reason we believe it is clear that the Legislature intended only the
resident or his proxy to be able to vindicate infringement of these rights by
an action for damages. Had the Legislature intended to confer this right on
others, it would have explicitly done so. We therefore
[189 N.J. Super. 89]
conclude that plaintiffs have no
standing to bring this suit under the act reviewed.
In view of this conclusion, it is
unnecessary to address the remaining contentions and arguments of the parties.
Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. Defendant's statement of facts described Ferdinand
Virgilio as 96 years old and suffering from organic brain syndrome and
arteriosclerosis. These facts do not appear in the record.
2. Point II of plaintiffs' brief states: Plaintiffs are suing on a
statutory cause of action and requirements for a common law cause of action
have no application to this case.