Liability of Owner of Commercial Property for
Defects, Snow and Ice Accumulation and Other
Dangerous Conditions in Abutting Sidewalks Model Jury charge 5.20
The law imposes upon the owner of commercial or business property the duty to use reasonable care to see to it that the sidewalks abutting the property are reasonably safe for members of the public who are using them. In other words, the law says that the owner of commercial property must exercise reasonable care to see to it that the condition of the abutting sidewalk is reasonably safe and does not subject pedestrians to an unreasonable risk of harm. The concept of reasonable care requires the owner of commercial property to take action with regard to conditions within a reasonable period of time after the owner becomes aware of the dangerous condition or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become
The law imposes upon the owner of commercial or business property the duty to use reasonable care to see to it that the sidewalks abutting the property are reasonably safe for members of the public who are using them. In other words, the law says that the owner of commercial property must exercise reasonable care to see to it that the condition of the abutting sidewalk is reasonably safe and does not subject pedestrians to an unreasonable risk of harm. The concept of reasonable care requires the owner of commercial property to take action with regard to conditions within a reasonable period of time after the owner becomes aware of the dangerous condition or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become
aware of it.3 If, therefore, you find that there was a condition of this sidewalk that
was dangerous in that it created an unreasonable risk of harm for pedestrians, and if
you find that the owner knew of that condition or should have known of it but
failed to take such reasonable action to correct or remedy the situation within a
reasonable period of time thereafter as a reasonably prudent commercial or
business owner would have done under the circumstances, then the owner is
negligent.
NOTE TO JUDGE
Include the following where notice of the condition is an issue.
But, in this case, the property owner contends that he/she had no notice or knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for it. In that connection, I must make you aware of this rule: The owner of commercial or business property is chargeable with a duty of making reasonable observations of his/her property, including the abutting sidewalk, in order to discover any dangerous condition that might develop or occur. The owner must make observations of his/her property, including the sidewalk, with the
3If the unsafe condition is alleged to be snow and ice, N.J.S.A. 40:64-12 and any ordinance adopted by the municipality might be charged as a factor, the jury should consider the reasonableness of the time the defendant(s) has (have) waited to remove or reduce a snow or ice condition from the sidewalk.
NOTE TO JUDGE
Include the following where notice of the condition is an issue.
But, in this case, the property owner contends that he/she had no notice or knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for it. In that connection, I must make you aware of this rule: The owner of commercial or business property is chargeable with a duty of making reasonable observations of his/her property, including the abutting sidewalk, in order to discover any dangerous condition that might develop or occur. The owner must make observations of his/her property, including the sidewalk, with the
3If the unsafe condition is alleged to be snow and ice, N.J.S.A. 40:64-12 and any ordinance adopted by the municipality might be charged as a factor, the jury should consider the reasonableness of the time the defendant(s) has (have) waited to remove or reduce a snow or ice condition from the sidewalk.
frequency that a reasonably prudent commercial property owner would in the
circumstances. If you find that such a reasonable observation would have revealed
the dangerous condition alleged in this case, then the property owner is chargeable
with notice of the condition although he/she did not actually know about it; that is,
he/she is as much responsible for the condition as if he/she had actual knowledge
of its existence.
NOTE TO JUDGE
Include the following where the owner has taken some action with regard to the condition and the adequacy of the action is in question.
What actions must the owner of commercial property take with regard to defects/snow/ice accumulation/dangerous conditions? The action required by the law is action which a reasonably prudent person would take or should have taken in the circumstances present to correct the defect/snow/ice accumulation/ dangerous condition, to repair it/remove it or to take other actions to minimize the danger to pedestrians (for example, to give warning of it) within a reasonable period of time after notice thereof. The test is: did the commercial property owner take the action that a reasonably prudent person who knows or should have known
NOTE TO JUDGE
Include the following where the owner has taken some action with regard to the condition and the adequacy of the action is in question.
What actions must the owner of commercial property take with regard to defects/snow/ice accumulation/dangerous conditions? The action required by the law is action which a reasonably prudent person would take or should have taken in the circumstances present to correct the defect/snow/ice accumulation/ dangerous condition, to repair it/remove it or to take other actions to minimize the danger to pedestrians (for example, to give warning of it) within a reasonable period of time after notice thereof. The test is: did the commercial property owner take the action that a reasonably prudent person who knows or should have known
of the condition would have taken in that circumstance? If he/she did, he/she is not
negligent. If he/she did not, he/she is negligent.4
NOTE TO JUDGE
Where there is both a commercial and residential use of the property, the predominant use will determine the status of the property. Avalone v. Mortimer, 252 N.J. Super. 434 (App. Div. 1991), Wasserman v. W. R. Grace Co., 281 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1995).
Hambright v. Yglesias, 200 N.J. Super. 392, 395 (App. Div. 1985), (two-family home utilized as apartment building in commercial property so as to impose duty upon owner to remove the ice from abutting sidewalk). Borges v. Hamad, 247 N.J. Super 353 (Law Div. 1990); aff’d, 247 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1990) (owner-occupied three-family house in a residential zone, with two rental units occupied solely by family members, is residential property). There is no affirmative duty on a charitable or religious institution to maintain public sidewalks abutting their properties. Lombardi v. First United Methodist Church, 200 N.J. Super. 646 (App. Div. 1985). But see Brown v. St. Venatius School, 111 N.J. 325 (1998) (school deemed commercial); Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph, 306 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 1997) (leasing apartments even at below fair market value deemed commercial); Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 243 N.J. Super. 201 (Law Div. 1990) (fraternity deemed commercial property owner).
Owner of a vacant lot is not a commercial land owner for purposes of imposing sidewalk liability irrespective of the commercial status of the owner or the zoning. Briglia v. Mondrian Mortgage Corporation, 304 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1997); Abraham v. City of Perth Amboy, 281 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1995).
4See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981); Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390 (1983). (responsibility of commercial landowner for removal of snow or ice from public sidewalk). Stewart imposes liability on commercial landowners only.
See Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 1987) holding that Stewart, supra, establishes an absolute municipal immunity for deteriorated sidewalks; but, cf. Levin v. DeVoe, 221 N.J. Super. 61, at 64 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) disagreeing with the holding in Christmas. Shade Tree Commissions created by municipalities are granted absolute immunity pursuant to statute. Petrocelli v. Sayreville Shade Tree Commission, 297 N.J Super. 544 (App. Div. 1997). But see Learn v. City of Perth Amboy, 245 N.J Super. 577 (App. Div. 1991) where the Shade Tree Commission was merely advisory.
NOTE TO JUDGE
Where there is both a commercial and residential use of the property, the predominant use will determine the status of the property. Avalone v. Mortimer, 252 N.J. Super. 434 (App. Div. 1991), Wasserman v. W. R. Grace Co., 281 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1995).
Hambright v. Yglesias, 200 N.J. Super. 392, 395 (App. Div. 1985), (two-family home utilized as apartment building in commercial property so as to impose duty upon owner to remove the ice from abutting sidewalk). Borges v. Hamad, 247 N.J. Super 353 (Law Div. 1990); aff’d, 247 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1990) (owner-occupied three-family house in a residential zone, with two rental units occupied solely by family members, is residential property). There is no affirmative duty on a charitable or religious institution to maintain public sidewalks abutting their properties. Lombardi v. First United Methodist Church, 200 N.J. Super. 646 (App. Div. 1985). But see Brown v. St. Venatius School, 111 N.J. 325 (1998) (school deemed commercial); Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph, 306 N.J. Super. 456 (App. Div. 1997) (leasing apartments even at below fair market value deemed commercial); Gilhooly v. Zeta Psi Fraternity, 243 N.J. Super. 201 (Law Div. 1990) (fraternity deemed commercial property owner).
Owner of a vacant lot is not a commercial land owner for purposes of imposing sidewalk liability irrespective of the commercial status of the owner or the zoning. Briglia v. Mondrian Mortgage Corporation, 304 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 1997); Abraham v. City of Perth Amboy, 281 N.J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1995).
4See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981); Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 92 N.J. 390 (1983). (responsibility of commercial landowner for removal of snow or ice from public sidewalk). Stewart imposes liability on commercial landowners only.
See Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 393, 400 (App. Div. 1987) holding that Stewart, supra, establishes an absolute municipal immunity for deteriorated sidewalks; but, cf. Levin v. DeVoe, 221 N.J. Super. 61, at 64 n.1 (App. Div. 1987) disagreeing with the holding in Christmas. Shade Tree Commissions created by municipalities are granted absolute immunity pursuant to statute. Petrocelli v. Sayreville Shade Tree Commission, 297 N.J Super. 544 (App. Div. 1997). But see Learn v. City of Perth Amboy, 245 N.J Super. 577 (App. Div. 1991) where the Shade Tree Commission was merely advisory.
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